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ABSTRACT
The 2012 crisis in Mali, where the state collapsed and terrorist
groups took over the north, came as a surprise to many. Mali had
been considered a poster-child for democracy and was judged as
considerably more stable than its neighbors by leading quantitative
indices of state fragility. This article explores how quantitative risk
and qualitative threat approaches led to incomplete analyses, and
how bureaucratic processes stifled a holistic diagnosis of the situ-
ation in Mali. French and Dutch government views are analyzed,
adding new empirical information on how ministries and embassies
were unwilling to call out disconcerting developments in Mali.
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The crisis that engulfed Mali in early 2012 surprised many policymakers and analysts
alike. Within several months a separatist Tuareg uprising had violently evicted the
security forces from the north of the country, a handful of junior officers and noncom-
missioned officers had launched a coup d’etat, and subsequently the Tuareg rebels saw
their uprising hijacked by three Salafi-jihadist groups. Mali had abruptly turned from a
poor but relatively peaceful and stable West-African country to one where an appointed
interim government attempted to govern the southern remnant of the country (and
keep the influence of the junta limited), with the north—two thirds of the country—de
facto an Islamic state controlled by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its
partners. As perceived by its neighbors and expressed by UN resolutions and reports,
the situation entailed a humanitarian crisis and a threat to international peace and
security.1 When the Salafi-jihadist groups unexpectedly attacked southern Mali in
January 2013, France intervened and used a large military force to evict the terrorist
groups from the north. In July/August 2013 presidential elections were held, and the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
of nearly 12.000 peacekeepers was established to help the government reassert its
authority in the north and assist the peace process. A May 2013 international donor
conference held in Brussels, Belgium, raised e3,25 billion in pledges for aid and recon-
struction projects. The costs of the 2012 crisis, in human suffering, have been enormous
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and Mali is currently characterized by a fragile peace accord and a deteriorating security
situation.
Open sources indicate that the prevailing analysis of Mali before the 2012 crisis was a
rosy one. Western Ministries of Foreign Affairs saw Mali as a “poster child” for democ-
racy in an otherwise volatile region.2 At the same time it was a “donor darling” for the
international aid community, receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in aid money,
with aid surging during the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. According to Craven-
Matthews and Englebert, from 1967 to 2013 Mali received an average of 15 percent of
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from aid, in contrast to 3.75 percent for the rest of
Sub-Saharan Africa.3 On the Fund for Peace’s “Failed States Index” in 2011, Mali was
placed in 76th position, on a par with India, while neighboring Niger—that shared
many problems, such as Tuareg separatism—stood at 15th place.4 With the exception of
Algeria (81st place) and Senegal (85th), most of Mali’s seven neighbors were estimated
to be much more fragile: Côte d’Ivoire (10th), Guinea (11th), Burkina Faso (37th), and
Mauritania (42nd). AON, a global financial services company that provides an annual
“Political Risk Map” used by insurers worldwide, judged in 2011 that Mali was at lesser
risk of political upheaval than nearly all its neighbors.5 There was certainly awareness
that Tuareg separatism was a latent problem, with the peace process faltering after the
2006 uprising, the third since independence in 1960.6 The problem of AQIM in the
north was also well known, with a significant body of academic literature focusing on
the kidnapings of Western tourists and terrorist attacks in the region.7 So why did the
collapse of Mali come as such a surprise? Considering the huge costs of the crisis—in
terms of suffering and money—a more accurate appraisal of the situation could have
allowed different actors, from the Malian government to the international community—
to invest in preventing or cushioning the crisis.
One reason is that Mali’s crisis did not occur overnight. Rather, it was a combin-
ation of different events, each precipitating or triggering a next event. With the benefit
of hindsight, several turning points can be identified. The fall of the Gadhafi regime
and the exodus of several thousand Tuareg fighters back to Mali served as the initial
catalyst. In October 2011, two Tuareg groups striving for an independent Azawad
joined forces to form the Mouvement national pour la liberation de l’Azawad’
(MNLA), which formed an informal alliance with three Salafi-jihadist groups (AQIM,
its offshoot ‘Mouvement pour l’unicite et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest’ (MUJAO),
and Ansar Dine). The first turning point constituted the start of the armed insurrec-
tion on 17 January 2012. The second turning point concerned the coup on 22 March
2012. It occurred weeks before the first round of the presidential election was planned
(27 April), ending two decades of democratic elections. President Amadou Toumani
Toure (popularly referred to by the acronym ATT) fled the country, with few Malians
mourning his departure. The coup accelerated the military’s rout in the north, with
the cities Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal falling into rebel hands. The third and final turn-
ing point concerned the takeover of the north by the three Al Qaeda–affiliated groups.
The MNLA was violently evicted by the better resourced Al Qaeda groups. The result
was a full-fledged terrorist sanctuary, encompassing two thirds of Mali’s territory. The
contrast with Mali’s situation at the end of 2011 could not have been more stark. Was
the crisis unforeseen as the result of a methodological issue?
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Separate Worlds of Risk and Threat
Scholarly literature on risk and threat analyses is clustered in different scientific disci-
plines. Risk assessment and risk management are in many respects regarded as scientific
disciplines per se, and risk analysis is essential to engineering, the health sector, general
economic activity, and the insurance business, among others. From international stand-
ards such as the ISO 27000 series to legislation on compliance, risk management has
been integrated into many business and scientific fields, with several academic journals
dedicated to the topic.8 Political risk is a subset of the broader risk assessment field,
and is in part focused on coverage for expropriation. While consensus on terminology
is elusive, risk is commonly distinguished from uncertainty when the probability distri-
bution of the factors studied can be determined objectively.9 As such, risk is seen as the
quantitative multiplication of the probability of the occurrence of an event by its esti-
mated impact. When the probability is estimated on a subjective basis, this is labeled as
uncertainty. In practice, much of risk assessment falls in this category, as many values
and probabilities cannot be determined objectively.
Like risk, there is no single agreed-on definition of threat. Threats are generally
understood as the intention of an actor to cause deliberate harm to someone or some-
thing. Although natural causes like hurricanes or floods can certainly “threaten” com-
munities, in the social sciences the concept of threat is rooted in security studies. As the
parameters of security have widened to nonmilitary phenomena, with human security
now as much an object as state security, an associate broadening of the definition of
threat would be logical.10 Traditionally, however, safety studies (often the technical dis-
ciplines) focus on natural causes or human accidents, while malicious actors and actions
fall in the field of security studies. A threat therefore has the potential to adversely
impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation),
organizational assets, or individuals. A threat is a potential for harm. The presence of a
threat does not mean that it will necessarily cause actual harm. It is on the nature of
the occurrences.
Concerning intelligence studies and threat analyses, a large body of research has
formed around intelligence failures, investigating how analysts missed crucial threats to
peace. From Pearl Harbor to Operation Barbarossa and Yom Kippur to 11 September
2001 (9/11), scholars have tried to determine whether the intelligence failure was one of
collection or analysis, or both, or whether the policymaker was unwilling to heed the
warning.11 In many cases national security was at stake, with agencies and analysts fol-
lowing and focusing on certain developments, which were then missed or misinter-
preted. There is also the broader field of indicator and early warning analyses.12 During
the Cold War, techniques were improved after decades of observing and analyzing the
opponent’s behavior. While this field also applies to nonstate actors, it is more difficult
to identify indicators that capture the few predicable paths that these groups need to
follow when executing operations.13 The core requirement for successful indicator and
warning analyses remains a sharp focus on the actor/subject in question, time and
energy to hone understanding of its behavior, and then the ability to identify deviations
from the norm. For Africa, several early warning systems have been set up in the field
of conflict prevention, management, and resolution.14 There have been some generic
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studies into the effectivity of these mechanisms, but they have not focused in detail on
specific case studies.15
This article explores how the quantitative risk and qualitative threat approach deal
with analyzing threats to fragile states. Theoretically, causality could be demonstrated by
either inferring it statistically or by observation as a process. A comparative study by
Tang et al. investigated how both approaches addressed the question, “does oil cause
ethnic war?”. They concluded that a quantitative approach alone cannot establish causal
mechanisms, including its contextual impact, but that a qualitative approach has some
critical advantages, such as focusing on deep causes.16 The focus on causality resulted in
a more fine-grained and accurate assessment. The importance of investigating causal
mechanisms is supported by other studies.17 In the practical execution of research, add-
itional problems with quantitative research are often a lack of agreement on coding and
what should be the basic data set. These scholars believe that we must rely on statistical
relations and logical inferences, because causality is not directly observable. By investi-
gating how the quantitative and qualitative approaches were applied to Mali and what
was observed and what was not, a clearer indication of the biases of each methodology
can be distilled.
Quantitative Risk Analyses
The Fragile States Index (FSI) is the most well-known country fragility index and a pri-
mary example of a quantitative risk assessment based on specific indicators. There are
many indices for measuring fragility, as comprehensively analyzed by Mata and Ziaja in
their report “User’s Guide on Measuring Fragility.”18 At the time of their report (2009),
there were eleven indices, including the Political Instability Index by the Economist
Group, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment and the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). Some have since suffered a quiet demise,
while others have been refashioned. The Failed State Index, for example, was re-bap-
tized the Fragile State Index in 2014.19 Each index or ranking uses different data sour-
ces, methodologies, and displays. Important are the underlying notions: does the index
measure the fragility of the state, or of society in general? Also debated is whether vio-
lent conflict is a cause, symptom, or consequence of fragility. The underlying assump-
tions and foci often remain undefined. Mali was ranked differently by each index, but
the scores did not deviate significantly from the general conclusion that the country was
stable by regional standards. The BTI, for example, which detailed its methodology in a
more transparent fashion than the FSI, put Mali in second place (after Ghana) in its
regional findings for West and Central Africa in 2012.20
The fragility indices can be qualified as variants of risk analyses. By using empirical
data, standardizing certain values, aggregating results, and then weighting the scores,
results are calculated. A consistent methodology is used for all countries and applied in
a centralized fashion. Central to the methodological process are indicators. These have
been identified as valuable terms of measurement—metrics—and quantified (if they do
not already consist of numbers) to allow scoring. As with many risk management
approaches, the emphasis lies not on the exact probability of an event and the estimated
impact of its eventual occurrence, but rather the identification of several variables
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indicating positive measures (e.g., an organization’s preparation for an event) or nega-
tive developments (risk, or in this case state fragility). From a logical perspective the fra-
gility indices do not estimate the probability of state collapse, as the outcome of state
fragility can lead to many different forms of political and economic incidents and crises,
all varying in severity and impact.
There has been significant criticism of the FSI and other fragility indices. At a funda-
mental level, the very concept of “fragile state” has been questioned, as it presupposes
successful states. Some argue that the term is a construct coined by the West to enhance
the legitimacy of major donor-led reforms in the financing of development aid, promot-
ing Western policy “remedies” such as state-building and peace-building interventions
for poverty and war.21 At a more substantive level, criticism of the FSI can be clustered
around several themes including its effect, usefulness as a policy instrument, emphasis
on internal (national) factors, problems of logic and inference, and correct use of statis-
tical data. Some authors contend that it focuses on symptoms rather than causes of fra-
gility. Others argue that the FSI places too much emphasis on the importance of state
institutions— implying more state building as a policy solution—while at the same time
underestimating the (negative) impact of Western foreign policy choices.22 Questions
are also placed at the assumptions underpinning the interpretation of empirical data
and the valuation of local constructs. For example, sharp population growth, authoritar-
ian regime type, and low GDP are all implied to increase state fragility. This, however,
may not be supported by empirical data.23
Opaque methodologies prevent an analysis of why the fragility indices led to such an
optimistic picture of Mali pre-2012. According to the Fund for Peace, country rankings
are calculated using twelve specific indicators across four categories or dimensions:
Cohesion, Economic, Political, and Social. Over 100 sub-indicators are used, but they
remain unspecified and no definitive list is given.24 It is further unclear which metrics
are used. Three types of data are used: (1) content analysis; (2) quantitative data sets;
and (3) qualitative review. The content analysis involves a scan of millions of docu-
ments (media articles, reports, etc.) to assess the salience of each sub-indicator in each
country. The actual process remains unspecified.25 In short, the possibility of validating
a calculation—a core tenet of a scientific approach—is absent.
An alternative would be to investigate whether certain indicators would have been able
to identify causes or contributors to the crisis in Mali. While the causes of the crisis can
be manifold (see the next section), a sectoral approach, for example, would investigate
the security component that led to the crisis. This would focus on the strength of the
actors posing a threat, such as the MNLA insurgent and AQIM terrorist groups, and off-
set this against the capacity and ability of Mali’s security forces to counter them. The first
aspect—measuring the strength of nonstate armed groups—is notoriously difficult to do,
even for seasoned intelligence analysts. The capability of security forces is also difficult to
measure, for different reasons. On paper the Malian army would not have differed signifi-
cantly from its regional peers. The few units that were trained by French and U.S. forces
appeared to perform reasonably in combat in early 2012, but nearly all other Malian units
disintegrated on contact with the enemy.26 Unit personnel strength is easy to measure,
operational readiness is more difficult (although some countries calculate this for their
own units), but battlefield efficacy escapes quantification.
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Other, more indirect contributors to the crisis would have been equally difficult to
capture in metrics. All the fragility indices use economic indicators, and build on the
premise that economic development has a positive correlation with political stability.
Most of Mali’s economy is agricultural and informal, and escapes realistic quantification
in figures. The empirical data generated by Western economies is frequently absent in
developing countries, or difficult to collect and unreliable when provided. Political indi-
cators are equally difficult to operationalize as quantifiable metrics. Elections are
regarded as positive factors for stability, but events in the Balkans and Iraq, for instance,
undermine this fundamental assumption. Here elections led to an increase in sectarian-
ism, cemented the position of spoilers in society, and ultimately contributed to further
instability.27 During the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections in Mali, there were serious
instances of fraud, with the electoral committee annulling half a million votes in 2002.28
Between 1991 and 2012, turnout was extremely low at around thirty percent each time,
and even less for the parliamentary elections.29 Close observers were well aware of the
façade of Malian democracy, and estimated that ATT was not so much fairly elected as
anointed by his predecessor, President Alpha Oumar Konare, in 2002. Nonetheless, the
country’s reputation as a “poster child for democracy” stuck.
When determining which indicators are best used for measuring fragility, the debate
on metrics for progress during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations can provide valu-
able insights. The Western intervention in Afghanistan (2001–present) grappled with
the dilemma of how to measure the effect of military and development policies. The
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) initially focused on the number of inci-
dents and killed/wounded in action (on both the enemy and their own sides), not dis-
similar to the U.S. military’s reliance on body counts during the Vietnam war. Security,
however, is more complex than tallying incidents and losses.30 Sometimes insurgents
exerted such control over an area that they did not need to launch attacks. As part of
COIN doctrine, David Kilcullen proposed using other metrics to analyze progress and
security. Potential indicators for local security could be the price of vegetables and fruit,
assassination/kidnap rate, where local officials sleep, and where their business interests
lie.31 On the development side, statistics often focused on the input of the international
effort—for instance, money spent—or the output, such as schools built—rather than the
outcome, such as children finishing school. It raises the question how the qualitative
approach— compared to the quantitative—then deals with such issues.
A Qualitative Threat Approach
The broad body of qualitative research on Mali pre-2012 can be divided into two
groups: generic social sciences and specific security studies. Authors like Benjamin
Soares, Bas Lecocq, Georg Klute, and others focused on the role of Islam, tribal politics,
local politics, and Sahelian cultures, noting the complexities of Malian society and the
nuances of different societal developments.32 A separate body of academic research,
rooted in the field of security studies, focused on the specific terrorist groups that
claimed responsibility for the attacks and hostage-takings occurring in the Sahel. Jean-
Pierre Filiu, Mathieu Guidere, and Djallil Lounnas focused on whether AQIM was a
local Algerian organization, or a global Al Qaeda one, and what role it played in the
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Arab Spring.33 Several scholars expressed their skepticism regarding the assumption
then underpinning the Global War on Terrorism, and U.S. (and Algerian) policy to
include the Sahel in counterterrorism efforts. A 2004 article in Air Force Magazine titled
“Swamp of Terror in the Sahara” warned that “Unless unchecked, the terrorist infest-
ation could turn parts of Africa into launchpads for tomorrow’s murderous outrages.”34
The article embodied the policy hyperbole on terrorism and ungoverned spaces, and
was extensively cited by scholars as an example of securitization. Jeremy Keenan took a
more radical view, arguing that the terrorist threat had actually been fabricated by
Algeria (and the United States) to further geopolitical and economic interests.35 Keenan
expanded the theme of state terrorism, arguing that the Algerian intelligence service
(DRS) was at the heart of AQIM.36 Coherent with this take, he and other authors
argued that the Malian state had become more unstable, not so much due to growing
radicalism, but rather as a direct result of U.S. and Malian counterterrorist policies.37
Concerning the qualitative threat analysis, it is important to determine which threat
actor is threatening which object. Is the object the Malian state, government, or society,
and are the malicious threat actors insurgents, criminals, or terrorists?38 If applied to a
terrorist grouping, a threat approach investigates the possibility of the group conducting
operations against certain targets. Because it involves human intent, a threat is difficult
to calculate. In contrast to risk analyses, therefore, threat analyses are qualitative and
not quantitative in nature, and specific rather than generic. The focus lies on the mali-
cious actor. In the intelligence sector a threat analysis is frequently accompanied by a
predictive element. For example, potential aggressive military operations by an adversary
will be estimated on a spectrum that can range from impossible, highly unlikely to
highly likely or ultimately, imminent. This estimation is generally further circumscribed
by a disclaimer framework, accompanying the judgment with a statement of high or
low confidence.39 As most scholarly research on fragile states and terrorism does not
seek to forecast but to elucidate, this framework is absent in the social sciences.
The design of a threat analysis often involves the identification of drivers. When ana-
lyzing developments in the field of international affairs or conflict studies, three layers
can generally be distinguished: events, patterns of events, and drivers. Drivers are at the
“deepest” level and have a causal relationship with the pattern of events.40 They are not
only useful for analysis and scenario building, but their identification can help policy-
makers influence the pattern of events towards certain desired directions. Within some
military intelligence units, analyses are made through so-called driver-based scenario
building. In this approach drivers on actors are generated through a Strengths-
Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats inventory.41 A causal loop diagram for the drivers
on factors is made for the different drivers and factors involved. This consists of nodes
(the variables, or drivers in this case) and edges; the links that indicate a connection or
relationship between nodes. It is not known whether such analyses were made before
the Mali crisis of 2012, but several actor/factor driver-based threat analyses were made
for the MINUSMA mission in Mali in the years after the crisis.42
Intelligence reports frequently use the categories of activities, capabilities, and inten-
tions to structure analyses. Rather than the indicators of risk analyses, a threat approach
identifies drivers—factors or processes that contribute to violent conflict. Researchers
often disagree which ones matter: greed or grievance; push or pull.43 A threat approach
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also faces different methodological challenges than a risk approach. Whereas a risk
approach is predicated on a systematic process, a calculation of certain selected variables
and metrics, a threat estimation frequently lacks a structured methodology that is simi-
lar to a risk analysis. This mirrors post-crises research, where the term “root causes”
can serve as a label without methodological basis. Important, therefore, is clarity on the
conceptual framework used when analyzing potential threats posed by actors.
A qualitative approach to state fragility and human security, focusing on threats,
therefore produces different results from a risk approach. While the latter is predicated
on a structured methodology—that is albeit flawed—a threat approach often lacks one
in the first place. And if there are structured approaches present, they may vary consist-
ently. With relative consensus among the indices on Mali’s stability, the (threat) litera-
ture on Mali pre-crisis is characterized by extremes poles of interpretation. Media and
policy discourse emphasized the terrorist threat, juxtaposed by the albeit minority claim
that terrorism was a fabricated construct, camouflaging oil and geopolitical interests. At
the same time studies were generally narrow analyses, focusing on specific malicious
actors, or covering an element in the political, economic, or social domain. The country
was the exclusive research domain of a handful of experts, each working from a specific
scientific discipline and on a narrow topic. Holistic approaches were lacking, and as
such the general fragility of the Malian society and state was not recognized. Between
2001 and 2012 the International Crisis Group, as purveyor of quality analyses of fragile
states, wrote only one report on Mali—the 2005 study of Sahelian terror threats.44 Since
the crisis erupted in 2012, it has published several reports annually. If there is no con-
sensus that a state or region is prone to crises, very little research will focus on it. Once
a crisis has erupted, it attracts all the attention.
Comparing Threat and Risk Analyses
There is a fundamental difference in the methodological orientation of risk and threat
assessments. As a result, they have different characteristics. They will be arranged in the
next table. Before doing so, however, the differences in orientation at its deepest meth-
odological level—the a and b—need explanation. The a and b concern erroneous out-
comes of hypothesis testing. The a is the chance that an observer incorrectly concludes
that there is a significant relationship between phenomena. The b is the chance that
one does not discover a weak, but actual existing, relationship between phenomena. In
statistical hypothesis testing, these are analogous to a type I error where a true null
hypothesis is incorrectly rejected (a false positive) and a type II error corresponds to
incorrectly retaining a false null hypothesis (a false negative). In an analogy between
statistical testing and a judge’s decision (where the null hypothesis equates to the pre-
sumption of innocence), a Type 1 error concerns the conviction of an innocent person,
and a type 2 the acquittal of a guilty one.45 In the field of international relations, an
example of a type 1 error is the rejection of the hypothesis that Saddam Hussein did
not have weapons of mass destruction; a type 2 error is the failure to determine a link
between the arrested Al Qaeda member Zacarias Moussaoui and the other hijackers,
after his flight instructor became suspicious and informed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Put differently, the a is on proof and explanation—on the certainty of the
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relationships discovered—and the b on the relationships missed. A risk assessment,
therefore, is aimed at reducing the a (and the probability of a false positive). A threat
analysis primarily aims at not missing a threat, reducing the value of the b.
To produce forecasts in the risk assessment column, sufficient data need to be present
to produce correlations with a satisfying/set level of significance. This limits the time
span that risk assessments can remain valid. Drivers, on the contrary, deal with the
deep-level processes that characterize longer-term threat assessments. Quantitative ana-
lysis is per definition trend oriented. Only when a qualitative analysis is also made can
other factors be incorporated. In driver-based scenario building, the speed and direction
in which drivers evolve are assessed. The focus lies on core uncertainties, with the
objective of making an inventory of the drivers with the highest impact and the highest
uncertainty. Those drivers will then be selected to construct the axes of the scenario.
These scenarios can be enriched by a system of qualitatively selected critical indicators.
These critical indicators are—as a result of the selection process—unique for every case.
The indicators used in the FSI or other fragility indices, however, are generic for the
whole sample of countries under investigation. In risk analyses the emphasis lies on
mitigating impact and occurrence, and the focus lies not on unique cases but rather a
systematic overview. In contrast, a threat analysis uses the data unique to the case to
develop an understanding at the level of drivers.
The quantitative approach, associated with risk management and inherent to the indi-
ces on state fragility, therefore has certain characteristics and biases that determine what
is observed and what is not. First, the format—numbers, rankings, even color-codings—
impress the recipient with a notion of accuracy and reliability when neither is necessar-
ily present, and distort proportions, times, or other dimensions through the chosen dis-
play. Numbers and visuals—certainly in relation to state fragility—inherently obscure
nuance and over-simplify the intricate. Second, while a methodology is clearly present
for calculating scores, this can be built on untested or hidden assumptions. When the
methodology is not transparent, as it is for several fragility indices—these presupposi-
tions remain camouflaged, and calculations cannot be validated. Third, it remains diffi-
cult to identify metrics that operationalize indicators. While electoral turnout, security
incidents, or police strength can be quantified, many others cannot. Another issue is
how to weigh and aggregate these numbers to the final “fragility” score. Finally, the pur-
pose of these indices needs consideration. They can serve as guidance for general (stra-
tegic) policy advice, but early warning will only work when indicators are sensitive
enough to register small but relevant variations and reporting is at regular but short
intervals. Annual indices are by their very nature unqualified for early warning.
In a large study comparing U.S. military theater–level assessments in Vietnam, Iraq,
and Afghanistan, Connable researched the use of metrics and assessments.46 He con-
cluded that centralized and decontextualized quantitative methods shaped counterinsur-
gency assessments at the expense of contextual, relevant qualitative data and
comprehensive analytical methods. While quantitative data can still be valuable for a
commander’s assessments, his core message was that context is king. Further investiga-
tion into the efficacy of metrics for progress (focus on the positive) and indicators of
fragility (bias toward the negative) could generate valuable insights. Some of these prob-
lems can be countered by driver-based scenario building, at least in theory. The
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advantage is that drivers can identify possible points of mitigation, highlighting policy
options in certain areas.
Are these findings in line with studies on international relations? All the problems
for the quantitative approach—coding, basic set of data—are present. These are further
aggravated, however, by issues as untested and hidden assumptions, oversimplifications,
imperviousness to small but important variations, a lack of calculable data, and a lack
of transparency. Additional problems apply to the qualitative approach as well. This
concerns issues with sources, a lack of agreement on drivers and cause-and-effect rela-
tionships that matter, and even a lack of impartiality. This last issue—impartiality—
leads to a problem of a different nature—framing. Describing the dangers of applying
the terrorism frame postulated by U.S. and Western policy discourse, Judith Scheele
warned that “As a result, the few scholarly works that are based on an actual knowledge
of the areas concerned are increasingly swallowed up by the budding literature on
security concerns in the Sahara that, through its initial postulate of ‘great danger’ and
‘radical changes’ precludes in-depth local case studies or historical approaches.”47 She
added that “the threat” risked becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy. Academics (and ana-
lysts) searching for Islamic terrorists will probably find them, exacerbating existing mis-
understandings and conceptual divisions.
Friction
Practice does not always conform to theory. In his magnum opus On War, von
Clausewitz distinguished friction as the concept that distinguishes real war from war on
paper.48 Friction is arguably not limited to war in a narrow sense but is applicable
where large organizations strive to accomplish a certain mission. Friction occurs when
theory collides with the practical course of events, with chance impacting decisions as
well as actions. This section will investigate to what extent the Malian crisis took two
European governments by surprise. The case studies concern France and the
Netherlands, countries with differing but significant interests in Mali (both continued to
play an important role in Mali after the crisis). The reason for this selection is twofold.
First, the authors had access to French and Dutch language reports, and were able to
conduct several semi-structured interviews with (former) government officials involved
with policy/analyses on Mali. Second, both countries saw Mali as an important partner
but from different perspectives. For France, Mali was vital for security (and economic
and cultural) reasons. For the Netherlands the development aid sector played a pivotal
role. By focusing on the governments’ assessments of the situation on the ground, it
will become clear if and how these countries’ analyses diverged from the public indices
on the Malian state fragility. After all, intelligence analysts and policymakers equally use
open source data for their own analyses and policy advice. This section will further
investigate which agencies within government held particular viewpoints on Mali’s fra-
gility. In doing so, it will compare how intelligence communities viewed Mali, and what
the analyses of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs were, distinguishing between the minis-
tries in the capitals and the French and Dutch embassies in Bamako. These disparate
organizational units have diverging interests, outlooks, and standpoints.
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Both France and the Netherlands represent different relationships that Western coun-
tries have with African ones, potentially revealing how the prisms of geopolitics and
development aid can lead to different understandings of the local situation. France, as
the former colonial power in Mali, retained strong political, economic, and cultural ties
with Mali and Francophone West Africa. The Netherlands was an important donor
country, having provided hundreds of millions of euros in development aid to Mali in
the decade before the 2012 crisis, and continuing to do so afterward. The nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) community as a whole also deserves mention. As Steven
Esquith argued, power shifted in Mali from a traditional process of constitutional dialog
and democratic deliberation to an arrangement of corrupt “consensus” politics con-
trolled by government officials, donors, and the participation of NGOs.49 These NGOs
were therefore no longer innocent bystanders but accommodated themselves to state
corruption. The other major power in the Sahel was the United States, having launched
and run several multi- and bilateral counterterrorist programs from its African
Command (AFRICOM) after 9/11. As these programs and the underlying U.S. interests
have been covered extensively elsewhere, the next section will focus on the French and
Dutch positions.
The French Perspective
France remained an important player in Bamako after its independence in 1960. In con-
trast to other West African Francophone countries, French influence was more indirect
from a political–military and an economic perspective. No military intervention took
place between independence and Operation Serval, and the country was much less
enmeshed in the “Francafrique” network that characterized many of its neighbors.50
From a domestic and political perspective there was the question of hostages; in 2011
seven different French nationals were held in captivity by AQIM. Government policy
focused on both negotiating their release (and paying ransoms) as well as conducting
violent rescue attempts by special forces if and when the opportunity arose. As such,
the Sahel was a priority for France’s foreign intelligence service (la direction generale de
la securite exterieure [DGSE]), so much so that operators involved in France’s largest
military operation at the time, in the dangerous Afghan district of Surobi, felt that they
were the fifth wheel on the wagon.51 The Salafi-jihadists considered France and French
interests as their main target and AQIM’s links to diaspora in France made them a dir-
ect threat to national security. As a result, French intelligence had a strong focus on the
jihadist groups, collecting intelligence on their capabilities, activities, and intentions.
One of their primary goals was to find out where the hostages were being held, and
secure their release, either through negotiations or French military operations. In March
2012 the DGSE briefly learned of the whereabouts of several leading AQIM
commanders in Timbuktu and a special forces raid was considered but eventually
rejected by President Sarkozy.52
The DGSE had a strong focus on the tribal dynamics in the north and national polit-
ics in Bamako. Many authors in France, as well as Mali, suspect that the DGSE have a
strong pro-Tuareg bias.53 Their respect for the “blue warriors” appears in part historical,
in part a result of the Tuareg’s practical assistance in securing the release of hostages.
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This bias, however, not only shaped perception in Southern Mali of France aiding and
abetting separatists, but even influenced inter-ministerial relations in Paris. According
to author Jean-Christophe Notin, diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
or the Quai d’Orsay, felt that the DGSE’s reports were so pro-Tuareg that they stopped
reading them.54 The DGSE did not foresee the creation of Ansar Dine, the Salafi-jihad-
ist Tuareg group that was formed in the fall of 2011 by Iyad Ag Ghali, but was certainly
well aware of the dynamics leading to the January 2012 attack.55 After the attack was
launched, even open source intelligence would have provided ample information on the
MNLA and their progress on the battlefield in the north. Having learned from the
“Arab Spring” demonstrations in 2011, the MNLA extensively used social media plat-
forms like Facebook to coordinate, direct, and publicize their military operations.
Reports indicate that the DGSE had an equally strong understanding of Malian polit-
ics. It was no secret that corruption had hollowed out the state, and apparently the
French intelligence agency even had proof of collusion between ATT and the jihadists,
with details on how a senior member of his entourage informed AQIM.56 The DGSE
also had good intelligence on the state of the Malian security forces, predicting on 19
March that a military coup would probably take place on Saturday 24 March.57 It
occurred two days earlier than predicted. While indicative of good sources and a thor-
ough understanding of the dynamics in Bamako, this warning still needs contextualiza-
tion. An advisor at the Elysee palace—the presidential cabinet—noted that hardly a
week went by without a warning of a possible coup somewhere in Africa.58 At the same
time it is unclear what French policymakers could realistically have done with the infor-
mation provided.
The French MFA had its own sources and opinions on developments in Mali. At the
central level in Paris, policymakers were aware that Malian society suffered from
extreme corruption and that there was collusion between the state and organized crime.
For policymakers, the turning point that dispelled all doubts was the “Air Cocaine”
affair of 2009, where a Boeing 727 loaded with drugs landed in the desert and was
burned after unloading.59 In Bamako, Ambassador Christian Rouyer, a generalist with
experience in France’s prefectures and humanitarian work, succeeded Michel Reveyrand
de Menthon in March 2011. The latter had been ambassador for four years and would
later become the European Union’s Special Sahel Envoy. According to Notin,
Ambassador Rouyer concluded that corruption had permeated Malian institutions, up
to and including the presidential office, but more importantly, he was the first ambassa-
dor to say so openly.60 For him the Malians were in complete denial of the problems
facing their country. Malian officials in turn accused France of exaggerating the funda-
mentalist threat, with the French MFA’s warnings of insecurity scaring away tourists
that were so vital to the economy. For the embassy in Bamako, the diplomats in 2011
estimated that their leeway to shape or influence ATT’s policy was severely restricted.
They needed all his assistance on the delicate issue of the French hostages held by
the jihadists.
The French MFA was reluctant to criticize the Malian government or acknowledge
fundamental problems. Laurent Bigot, nicknamed Mr. Mali by the French press, was
deputy director of the West Africa Department and visited Mali in the fall of 2011. He
wrote a note warning of the explosive situation, but it had no effect. In July 2012, he
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gave a presentation on the situation in Mali at an academic conference of the Institut
Français des relations internationales in Paris.61 Discarding the language of diplomacy,
he emphasized how the West did not want to see the extent of corruption in Mali,
arguing that a feeling of superiority and intellectual laziness had led many to accept the
phenomenon of corruption as part of African culture. Serious incidents of electoral
fraud in the previous decade had been systematically downplayed, as Mali’s reputation
as a poster-boy for democracy continued to be lauded by Western observers. Since
much of the population continued to languish in poverty, radical Islam offered one of
the few outlets. Bigot finished his presentation by predicting that Burkina Faso would
be next to collapse. He was proven right in October 2014, when the country erupted in
violence after President Blaise Compaore attempted to change the constitution to fur-
ther prolong his 27 years in office. Even after the collapse of Mali, Bigot’s politically
incorrect description of Mali as a façade-democracy was unwelcome, and probably con-
tributed to his firing hardly a year later.62 He subsequently founded a consultancy advis-
ing on African affairs, and argued that many of the indicators and drivers of the crisis
in Mali applied equally to its neighbors.63 Before Mali’s collapse, the French MFA did
not share—or at least espouse—the view that Mali’s political system was corrupt to the
core, preferring to stay optimistic and focus on improving cooperation.64
The Dutch Perspective
The Dutch governmental prism for analyzing Mali originated in a different contextual
setting, but led to similar outcomes, including a shared reticence to recognize and publi-
cize the spoiler role of the Malian government. For the Dutch MFA, Mali was one of 15
partner countries earmarked for significant development aid. In 2010 Bamako received
at least e42 million through bilateral channels and more through multilateral programs,
making Mali the second largest recipient of Dutch aid after Afghanistan (where the
Dutch contributed more than 2,000 soldiers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[NATO] ISAF mission).65 In 2011, the MFA recalibrated the focus for development aid,
reducing the number of countries that were earmarked for large donor projects. Mali
remained one of the primary recipients of Dutch donor aid, and the government’s let-
ters to Parliament took note of programs where fraud/corruption had been discovered.
The bilateral relationship between both countries was good, and in December 2011
President ATT was welcomed by Queen Beatrix for an official state visit. His visit
occurred one month after Dutch citizen Sjaak Rijke was abducted by AQIM fighters in
Timbuktu (together with a Swedish and South African citizen), and concerns about the
security situation in northern Mali were covered by the Dutch media. During ATT’s
stay in the Netherlands, he mentioned the influx of Tuareg fighters from Libya and
requested material assistance for the Malian armed forces. Dutch press coverage of the
visit, however, focused more on how skilled the Malian government was in attracting
donor money.66
The Dutch development community in Mali objected to a what they perceived as
possible “securitization” of their domain. Their concern was not unfounded with studies
indicating that development aid was being recalibrated to fit the goals of the Global
War on Terror.67 As such, the MFA sought to keep Mali out of the remit of the
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intelligence community. In the Netherlands, foreign intelligence operations are con-
ducted by the two intelligence agencies, the general intelligence and security service
(AIVD) and the military intelligence and security service (MIVD). To coordinate and
allocate their operations and analytical foci, the government establishes a classified task-
ing instruction, allocating countries as well as topics to one of the two intelligence serv-
ices. This mission list, that is regularly updated, is a product of a political process
involving several ministries and is signed off on by the prime minister. The MFA played
a strong role in the interdepartmental negotiations as one of the primary intelligence
consumers, with the intelligence services vying with each other to cover—or to avoid—
certain topics. Several factors influence the allocation decision making, including the
military or civilian signature of the developments or threats in question and the limited
capacity to cover all areas of national (security) interest. As for Mali, two (former) intel-
ligence officials noted that the MFA wanted Mali to remain the exclusive domain of the
Foreign development aid sector, and consequently neither intelligence service was desig-
nated to monitor developments there.68 Libya was initially not allocated for a special
intelligence focus either, but became the remit of the MIVD once NATO was involved.
The uprising in Libya, and the broader Arab Spring, had taken the Western intelli-
gence community by surprise. Events unrolled rapidly in early 2011, and as concerns
grew that Gadhafi would massacre the remnants of the uprising in Benghazi, France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States started preparing for a military interven-
tion. The U.K. government, for instance, discovered that most of its initial intelligence
on Libya was based on maps dating from the Second World War and Wikipedia.69 The
Dutch MIVD had an equally limited information position on Libya, and started follow-
ing the developments as the anti-Gadhafi protests turned violent in February 2011.70
Once Gadhafi had been killed and spillover from the intervention began to impact
northern Mali, the single analyst covering Libya also became responsible for reporting
on these developments. In the last months of 2011, the analyst in question briefed
Dutch special forces ready to be deployed to West Africa as part of the annual Flintlock
training exercise. According to someone present at the briefing, the analyst concluded
that the exodus of Tuareg fighters from Libya to Mali would probably not lead to
armed violence in the north.71 This was, as events later proved, an incorrect assessment.
Before the 2012 crisis, the Dutch MFA was reluctant to accept warnings and negative
news from northern Mali. In 2010 the Department of State Fragility at the ministry in
the Hague had commissioned Wolfram Lacher, a researcher from the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), to write an internal report on the Program for Peace,
Security and Development in North Mali. This program intended to strengthen the
Malian state presence in the north. The report meant to investigate whether, and if so
how, the Dutch government should support the initiative. The author conducted field
work in Timbuktu and interviews in Bamako, and concluded that there was little polit-
ical will in Bamako to address grievances in the north. Another important but politically
inopportune conclusion was that the Malian state was involved in extensive collusion
with organized crime and the drug trade. In addition, he estimated that the way the
program was conceived would only exacerbate tensions. The reactions within the Dutch
MFA to his report were negative, and although the findings were briefly discussed at an
international workshop in December 2010 in Bamako, the report was not allowed to be
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distributed.72 Lacher later published a shorter and adapted version of the report as a
Comments paper for the think tank SWP.73
Conclusion
From an empirical perspective, this article has shown that many Western organizations
operating in Mali were well aware of the extreme fragility of the government pre-2012.
Embassies and NGOs contributed to upholding the façade, unable to disentangle them-
selves from the country’s endemic corruption and unwilling to reconsider its status as a
“donor darling.” The country’s elite knew how to game the system, and the inter-
national donor community became complicit in sustaining corruption through the
involved preferred partnerships. As such, the frailties of the state were acknowledged
but not openly discussed until late 2011. This article does not posit that the crisis could
or should have been predicted or foreseen. The 2012 crisis consisted of a cascade of
events, each turning out in a uniquely unfortunate way for the government in Bamako
(and the citizens in the north), and precipitating a subsequent turning point. Once the
crisis had run its course to the full jihadist occupation of the north, the framework of
reference for analysts also shifted. In the journal Foreign Affairs, Sebastian Elischer pre-
dicted that “After Mali Comes Niger.”74 While he avoided any dates, six years later
Niger has still been spared a crisis of this magnitude. Laurent Bigot was more prescient;
he correctly identified Burkina Faso as the next government that would collapse.
Exogenous factors played an important role in the 2012 Malian crisis. The influx of
Tuareg fighters that sparked the initial uprising was a direct but unintended conse-
quence of NATO’s intervention in Libya. It is possible that the French, British, and
American governments had not considered this potential side-effect as the intervention
was planned in haste, to prevent an impending massacre at Benghazi. Conversely,
organizational dividing lines between the Middle East/North Africa (and Sub-Sahara
Africa departments (traditional distinctions in business as well as governments) may
have impeded an integral analysis of the possible implications of Gadhafi’s removal.
Several MFAs, including the Dutch and French ministries, have resorted to the use of
intra-departmental Task Forces to improve policymaking on specific missions and
themes. As shown by the Dutch analysis of northern Mali, however, even a holistic and
detailed consideration of the factors at play can still lead to the wrong conclusions.
Terrorism, and AQIM in the Sahel, remain a transnational phenomena that transcends
national frontiers as well as traditional organizational boundaries within and among
government ministries. Driver-based scenario building should, by its very nature, inte-
grate exogenous factors into the analytical framework.
The authors have not been able to identify open source articles that combined a
quantitative and qualitative approach to analyze the general state of Mali pre-2012. An
example of a qualitative but multidisciplinary and holistic analysis is offered by the art-
icle “One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts,” but it was published in 2013, after
the crisis.75 Here the authors argued that the complex situation in Mali, including
Tuareg tribal politics, a contested political system in Bamako, jihadist developments in
the Sahel and regional/French power relationships, could only be addressed by a multi-
vocal analysis by different specialists. Using the Hippopotamus as an example— Mali’s
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national mascot—they illustrated how blind scholars touching different parts of an object
come up with differing explanations of what it is. The article incorporated several strands
of thinking and research, but is nonetheless retrospective, predominantly explaining how
events unfurled and to a lesser extent why. This interdisciplinary cooperation would have
been helpful before the crisis. Still, its holistic approach does not address issues as fram-
ing, friction, and impartiality. These elements remain problematic.
For Mali, the differing quantitative and qualitative approaches contributed to alterna-
tive realities, with neither contested by those in the field (who knew better). As illus-
trated by Table 1, the two approaches can be considered complementary rather than
competing, and a well-designed driver-based scenario-building exercise offers a practical
instrument that mitigates some of the biases. As such, by identifying drivers, wild cards,
and causal loops, policymakers will be better able to conceptualize the threats facing fra-
gile states. Ideally, a scenario exercise would include participants from different govern-
ment agencies: policy departments, embassies, and intelligence services. Just bringing
them together to exchange views contributes to transcending departmental stovepipes
and mitigating inherent tensions between organizations. This would allow governments
to better anticipate crises in the broader Sahel, as the region faces increasing insecurity
and violent conflict. A concerted effort to aid and support African early warning sys-
tems would also benefit all parties.
The French and Dutch governmental outlook on Mali pre-2012 shows how friction,
between theory and practice and between different governmental players, hampered an
effective analysis of the local situation. Some government departments were well aware
of the extreme fragility of the Malian state and society, but their assessments failed to
reach or influence policymakers. The political element of analyzing fragility remains a
challenge for national governments, and is even more problematic for international
organizations. The African Union (AU)’s early warning system, for example, is ham-
pered by member states’ general reluctance to have their domestic situation assessed or
even discussed by an external actor such as the AU.76 As Sherman Kent noted on intel-
ligence products, there is no effective warning if policymakers do not read the assess-
ment, read it but do not believe it, or believe it but do not take the conclusions
aboard.77 The crisis in 2012 might not have been foreseen, but those immersed in
Malian politics and society were not surprised.
Table 1. FSI and driver-based scenario building in intelligence research.
Risk assessment, quantitative (FSI)
Threat assessment, qualitative (driver-
based scenario building)
Methodology Primarily a-oriented (to assess/explain) Primarily b-oriented (not to miss)
Focus To assess the state of a nation To develop policy options
Future Presentþ near and mid term Mid and long term
Level Superficial level (indicator) Deeper level (driver)
Continuity Trend orientated (calculable) Change orientated (speed and direction
in which drivers develop; focus on
core uncertainties)
Data Event-based. Vulnerable for manipu-
lated, ambivalent, incomplete, hid-
den, and dirty data
To test the driver-based findings.
Explicitly designed to deal with data
absent/ambivalent
Type of insight Insurance-like: not pin-point, but a gen-
eralization of insights
Pin-point and case unique
Policy options To reduce impact and occurrence To manipulate drivers
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